<¶>The arguments made by the amici in support of appellee concern this second question. Amici urge this court paydayloanadvance.net/payday-loans-mi/cadillac/ to hold that the STLA is the exclusive authority governing payday loans in Ohio and that regardless of how lenders label them, payday loans must comply with the STLA. Thus, even if the MLA generally permits single-installment, interest-bearing loans, amici for appellee maintain that payday loans-short-term, unsecured, single-installment consumer loans-cannot be made under the MLA because they are specifically and exclusively regulated under the STLA.
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<¶>The STLA imposes duties upon a person licensed and “any person required to be licensed” under the act, and it prohibits licensees from engaging in any device or subterfuge to avoid the requirements of the act. R.C. (A); R.C. (J). Pursuant to R.C. (A), no person may make a short-term loan to an Ohio borrower without first obtaining an STLA license, but R. Thus, there is no language in the STLA that requires a lender to be licensed under that act before making a payday-style loan. Had the General Assembly intended the STLA to be the sole authority for issuing payday-style loans, it could have defined “short-term loan” more broadly.
To try to painting this new STLA because exclusive statutory expert to have pay check-type money, amici meant for appellee believe understanding the brand new MLA within the pari materia for the STLA describes all round Assembly’s intent
<¶>In an opinion issued shortly after the enactment of the STLA, the Ohio Attorney General recognized that the fact that R.C. to shows that the licensing requirement in R.C. (A) applies only to those lenders who make loans under that act and not to all lenders of loans of short duration. 2008 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No.2008–036, at *3. In that opinion, the Attorney General was answering a question posed by the Department of Commerce regarding the ability of a person licensed under the Check–Cashing Lender Law to make loans pursuant to that law while also holding an STLA license, prior to the 2008 referendum. But the opinion is not as narrow as the question presented. By stating that a person who “has a valid license to make another type of loan” may make a loan in conformance with the requirements of that license, free from the limitations of the STLA, id. at *3, fn. 5, the Attorney General recognized the independence of the various lending acts.
<¶>Appellant is not licensed under the STLA and is, therefore, not entitled to make short-term loans pursuant to the STLA. R.C. (A) and (A). But the loan here was not an STLA loan; it is undisputed that the STLA would not permit the subject loan, because its terms contravene the STLA’s requirements regarding the loan term, interest, and fees. Because appellant did not issue a “loan made pursuant to sections to of the Revised Code,” the loan does not qualify as a “short-term loan” subject to the requirements of the STLA.
<¶>Nothing in the STLA limits the authority of MLA registrants to make MLA loans. As the Attorney General recognized in 2008 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No.2008–036, at *4, H.B. 545 itself, at least implicitly, recognized the existence of an alternative statutory authority available to lenders previously licensed under the Check–Cashing Lender Law. See H.B. 545, Section 4(B) (requiring a licensee under the Check–Cashing Lender Law who applied for a license under the Small Loan Act for the 2008 licensing period to pay only half the license fee required by R.C. ).
<¶> In the absence of statutory ambiguity, however, we may not resort to rules of statutory interpretation. See State ex rel. Wolfe v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 186, 724 N.E.2d 771 (2000) (no need to apply interpretive rules to unambiguous statutory language); State v. Krutz, 28 Ohio St.3d 36, 37–38, 502 N.E.2d 210 (1986) (in pari materia rule applies only when a statute is ambiguous or the significance of its terms is doubtful).